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Did we really send men to fight in that?”The famous line ascribed to the British staff officer, Sir Launcelot Kiggell, has often been evoked to describe the Batt-
le of Passchendaele and how it is remembered in Britain, writes Nick Lloyd in the first 
article of this edition of British Politics Review. But as we approach the centenary of 
this battle that has come to symbolise the whole British World War 1 experience, Lloyd 
argues, there are good reasons to present a more nuanced picture than the traditional 
“tales of mud, blood and futility” which seem to dominate the UK government’s plans 
for the commemorations this year.
Taking Passchendaele as our point of departure, we ask the question: how do the 
British remember and commemorate the past, and for what purposes and in which con-
text is the past invoked in current debates? Maggie Andrews charts the development 
of Remembrance Sunday and Poppy appeals as two of the most visual examples of 
Heritage Britain, arguing that both are surrounded by a degree of controversy. Steven 
Fielding looks at the use of the past for political purposes today, examining the cultu-
ral memory of Labour’s election victory in 1945 – the “socialist moment” in Britain in 
the view of many – while John Gardner examines the so-called “Peterloo Massacre” 
of 1819, an historical event that has come to epitomise government use of violence 
against peaceful protesters, and over which a battle was fought “to control and set the 
narrative of the event in the minds of the public” shortly afterwards.
Brian Goodey takes stock of the British “heritage industry”, charting its expansion from 
the 1950s to today, and ask the question of whether “authenticity” is giving way to 
“interpretation” and “experience” under the current pressure of market forces. Sîan 
Nicholas, meanwhile, offers a critical review of the ways in which films and serialisations 
of World War Two have changed over time.
Perhaps history has never simply been “written by the winners”, despite the old saying. 
But in the present era of international turbulence, migration and globalisation, it is 
particularly interesting to see how the past is made into an object and asked to stand 
still. It will not.
Atle L. Wold & Øivind Bratberg (editors)
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The remembrance poppy has been used since 1921 to commemorate military personnel who have died in war. It was inspired by “In Flanders Fields”, a poem written during the First World War by the Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel John McCrae. Applied by the American Legion 
to commemorate American soldiers killed in that war (1914-1918), the poppy was soon adopted by military veterans’ groups in parts of the 
British Empire. In Britain, the red poppy is worn in the weeks before Remembrance Sunday. It is offered by the Royal British Legion and is 
also a means to support members and veterans of the British Armed Forces and their families today.
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2017 marks the centenary of the Third Battle of Ypres, more commonly known as Passchendaele, which has become synonymous with the futility and horror of the First World 
War. To commemorate the battle, the UK Government is plan-
ning a number of events. The first is a live performance that 
will retell the story of the battle in the Market Square, Ypres, on 
the evening on 30 July. The second is a ticket-only event at the 
CWGC Cemetery at Tyne Cot on the outskirts of Passchendaele 
village (now known as Passendale) the following day. A nationwi-
de search for descendants of those who fought has also been 
completed and 4,000 people will make their way to Ypres. Of 
these, 200 will be specially selected to take part in a Last Post 
ceremony at the Menin Gate on the evening of 30 July. 
These events have been organised by the Department for Cul-
ture, Media and Sport and although, as yet, we do not know 
exactly how they will unfold (and how the story of the battle will 
be interpreted), there seems to be a clear emphasis upon futility, 
horror and loss. ‘Conditions at Passchendaele were so horrific 
that they define our collective memory of the First World War’, 
records the government’s official 
website. ‘Bogged down by thick 
mud caused by heavy rain and 
bombardment, troops suffered 
heavy losses as they battled uphill 
to take the Passchendaele ridge. 
By 10 November 1917, the British 
eventually claimed a victory des-
pite suffering huge losses for very 
little territorial gain.’ The Cultu-
re Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Karen 
Bradley MP, has stated that ‘As 
we continue to commemorate the 
centenary of the First World War, 
it is important that we remember 
the horrors of the battlefields of 
Ypres and honour the many who 
lost their lives.’ 
The emphasis upon the futility of the battle and its legendary 
mud is commonplace and unsurprising. Indeed, if any battle se-
ems to sums up Britain’s memory of the war, it is Passchendaele. 
The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, called it ‘the 
campaign of the mud’ and historians have largely repeated his 
accusation that the battle was a great disaster that did nothing 
to bring the war to a successful conclusion. One of the most 
commonly recycled quotations from Passchendaele concerns 
the British staff officer, Sir Launcelot Kiggell, who asked, incre-
dulously, ‘did we really send men to fight in that?’ upon seeing 
the Ypres battlefield. Although there are good grounds for be-
lieving that this anecdote never actually happened (or if it did 
Kiggell used a different phrase), it seems to sum up the domi-
nant perception of the battle. How could such a terrible disaster 
have taken place? 
The Third Battle of Ypres: 100 years on.
The idea of a summer campaign in Flanders originated from the 
British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, 
who wanted to seize the Channel ports of Ostend and Zeebrug-
ge and to place the German Army under significant pressure in 
a vital sector of the Western Front. Haig believed that he could 
break the line, roll up the front, and win a major victory. He pla-
ced General Sir Hubert Gough, commander of the British Fifth 
Army, in charge and tasked him with breaking out of the Ypres 
Salient. Despite amassing an unprecedented array of artillery, 
Gough’s attempt to drive through the German defensive system, 
which was deeply-layered and studded with almost invulnerable 
concrete blockhouses (known as pillboxes), proved beyond his 
powers. Although the initial attack met with some success, the 
tactics of the German defenders (with their emphasis upon de-
fending in depth and making counter-attacks) were very difficult 
to deal with and the British struggled to make significant pro-
gress throughout August. They were not helped with the heavy 
rainfall, which broke on the first day of the battle and continu-
ed, with only temporary stoppages, throughout the following 
month, turning the battlefield in a waterlogged morass.
The failure to breakthrough in Au-
gust did not, however, cause Haig 
to abandon his plans for the Flan-
ders campaign. He moved Gough 
aside and appointed Sir Herbert 
Plumer, the commander of the 
British Second Army, to lead a 
renewed attack on the German 
positions. Plumer was a different 
kind of general to Gough: much 
more cautious and less aggressi-
ve, not a gung-ho ‘thruster’, but 
a careful, thoughtful and conside-
red man. Plumer did not aim to 
break through as Gough had. On 
the contrary, he planned a series 
of limited ‘bite and hold’ attacks 
that would not aim for more than 
his infantry could achieve. Based upon meticulous preparation 
and strictly-limited advances under a formidable array of artil-
lery, Plumer would bite off the German positions one at a time.
Plumer’s renewed attack took place on 20 September and mar-
ked the second major phase of the battle. The Battle of Menin 
Road (as it was subsequently known) was a much more effective 
demonstration of Britain’s military power. With a greater con-
centration of force, Plumer’s divisions were able to achieve their 
objectives and, crucially, hold onto them. When the Germans 
tried to counter-attack, they got nowhere. Instead of encounte-
ring strung-out and exhausted British units, Plumer’s troops were 
now well dug-in and backed up by heavy artillery and machi-
ne-gun fire. This was the essence of ‘bite and hold’: employ 




German prisoners and British wounded cross the Yser Canal near Boe-
singhe, 31 July 1917. (Photograph Q 5726 from the collections of the Im-
perial War Museums)
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the infantry in holding onto them, forcing the Germans to coun-
ter-attack into a hail of firepower. It turned the battle 
back in Haig’s favour.
Plumer was able to repeat his feat two more times in quick su-
ccession: at Polygon Wood on 26 September and Broodsein-
de on 4 October. On each occasion, Plumer made an advan-
ce of around 1,200 yards and chewed up more German units. 
Although there was little chance that Plumer would achieve a 
breakthrough (his operations were not designed to), his ham-
mer-blows put the German Army under enormous pressure. In-
deed the German High Command was at a loss with how to 
respond. They tried bolstering the front line with more men, but 
this did nothing other than fill Germany’s hospitals with yet more 
dying and wounded. After the attack on 4 October, there was 
flicker of panic in at German headquarters. They were struggling 
to keep their units up to strength, morale was plummeting, and 
the British artillery continued to pound them into submission. 
Indeed, there was little else the German Army could do other 
than hope the wet weather would return and deluge the battle-
field once again.
By November 1917 the British had reached the Passchendaele 
Ridge, but encountered a return to the problems of July and Au-
gust, namely worsening weather and not enough time to prepa-
re their attacks properly. Nevertheless, the battles that General 
Plumer fought between 20 September and 4 October marked 
the high point of the offensive and pioneered a new type of figh-
ting that proved highly effective. Indeed, had Plumer been in 
charge from the beginning, and had he been given more time to 
batter the defenders, then it is possible that the German Army 
would have been faced with a stark choice: continue to suffer or 
make a major retreat. 
100 years on the story of Third Ypres remains mired in tales of 
mud, blood and futility. Yet Passchendaele illustrated how chan-
ges in tactics and technology were transforming the battlefield 
and how, in the right circumstances, the British Expeditionary 
Force could be highly effective. It remains to be seen whether 
the UK Government’s commemorations will do justice to the 
complexity of the battle and the story of a remarkable triumph 
against the odds – what I have called a ‘lost victory’ – or whether 
it will recycle the old stories of suffering and stupidity. Perhaps in 
a year that will see Britain begin to carve out a new global role 
for itself, it is about time we moved on from the endless repetiti-
on of the horrors of the First World War and rediscovered some 
pride in the remarkable achievements of previous generations.
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In November 2016, a row erupted between the English Foot-ball Association and FIFA, (Fédération Internationale de Football Association). The dispute focused on whether the 
English football team could wear black armbands embellished 
with an embroidered red poppy during their World Cup quali-
fying match against Scotland on 11 November, the anniversary 
of WWI Armistice. The red poppy has been the symbol of The 
Royal British Legion (TRBL) since the charity was formed in 1921 
to care for members of the Armed Forces who suffered injuries 
in the First World War. Plastic and paper poppies were produced 
by disabled ex-servicemen,  and sold in the run up to Armistice 
day to raise funds for the Legi-
on to support servicemen and 
their families.  40 million pop-
pies are now produced annually 
commonly worn in November 
to remember those who lost 
their lives armed conflict.
 
The meaning of the red poppy 
is, like all symbols, contested; 
shifting and subject to appro-
priation, and most recently 
has taken on an almost sacred 
status. Their use and alleged 
misuse evokes fierce emotions. 
Approximately 5 million people 
visited the art installation made 
up of 888,246 ceramic red 
poppies entitled Blood Swept 
Lands and Seas of Red in the 
moat of the Tower of London 
between July and November 
2014, which commemorated 
British and colonial servicemen 
killed in the First World War. 
Yet, as recently as November 2000, neither English nor Scottish 
football teams wore poppies playing one another, nor did the 
English team wear poppies in their match against Yugoslavia on 
Armistice Day in 1987. But in 2016, the year of the Brexit vote 
and the rise of nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments, things 
were very different. 
In the twenty-first century a multicultural and divided Britain, un-
certain of its place in the world, increasingly regards narratives, 
images, memories and myths of the First and Second World War 
as intrinsic to its sense of national identity. In cultural memory, 
these conflicts are associated, albeit inaccurately, with an era 
when Britain wielded power and influence on the world stage, 
an era before the USA’s economic and political hegemony. Thus, 
the black armbands with an embroidered poppy both English 
and Scottish Football teams wore on 11 November 2016 were 
a display of respect for those who died in the First World War 
and an assertion of national identity; to FIFA as a “political” 
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symbol they contravened the regulations. As the row became 
increasingly heated, the new right-wing Conservative British Pri-
me Minister Theresa May described FIFA’s position as “utterly 
outrageous” whilst former England defender Danny Mills qu-
estioned whether the money spent on arguments, lawyers and 
the fines FIFA imposed would have been better donated to 
TRBL. His “common sense” position neglects the passion now 
invested in remembrance. In contemporary Britain wearing a 
poppy, remembrance activities and watching national sporting 
teams compete have all become legitimate areas for the emoti-
onal outpouring of national fervour which political groups seek 
to harness and position themselves 
in relation to.
Ironically, the poppy, now so in-
vested with ideas of Britishness was 
first embraced as a sign of remem-
brance in the USA and Canada at 
the instigation of Moina Michael. 
The poppy’s association with the 
First World War dead was inspired 
by the poem, In Flanders Fields writ-
ten by a Canadian Medical Officer 
Col. John McCrae, in May 1915. The 
poem begins: 
In Flanders fields the poppies blow 
Between the crosses, row on row 
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.
By the time that TRBL adopted 
the red poppy as its emblem, the 
commemoration of the 1914-18 
conflict on Armistice day, had taken 
on what have become familiar its characteristics, including two 
minutes silence at 11 o’clock to mark the cessation of hostilities. 
This practice started in 1919, following a press release from Bu-
ckingham Palace stating : 
Tuesday next, 11 November, is the first anniversary of the Armi-
stice, which stayed the worldwide carnage of the four preceding 
years and the victory of Right and Freedom.
The following year the Cenotaph was unveiled in Whitehall. The 
stone monument was produced in response to public pressure 
after a similar temporary wooden and plaster edifice was crea-
ted for the July 1919 peace celebrations. Since 1920, political 
dignitaries, members of the royal family and war veterans have 
participated in the two minutes silence and an Armistice Day 
ceremony at the cenotaph.  Media coverage gave this national 
significance; newspaper front pages and film newsreels watched 
by millions provided a lexicon of images of remembrance. Furt-
hermore by the early 1930s most homes had a radio, enabling 
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Royal British Legion poppy, worn in the UK and other 
Commonwealth countries from late October to Remem-
brance Sunday to remember those servicemen and women 
who died in war. (Photograph: Philip Stevens.)
 British Politics Review
the two minutes silence to become a national event, shared via 
the airwaves; simultaneously participated in in homes across the 
country, where it became part of everyday life, a backdrop to 
domestic chores. By the 1930s war memorials had become part 
of the landscape of almost every town and village in Britain, but 
controversy over their use emerged alongside anxiety over the 
possibility of another military conflict. The Women’s Co-ope-
rative Guild, a political left-leaning national housewives orga-
nization, produced white poppies to convey their commitment 
to peace, however, when they laid white poppy wreaths at war 
memorials on Armistice Day, it was not always well received.  Yet 
the League of Nations Union also chose this day to campaign 
against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. 
Even in the aftermath of the Second World War, the performan-
ce of military remembrance continued to be shaped by the ico-
nography of the First World War, although the focus of activities 
shifted from Armistice Day to Remembrance Sunday, set at the 
Second Sunday in November, nearest to 11 November. It was 
intended to commemorate those who had served in both wars 
and the names of the Second World War dead were added onto 
local World War One memorials. In the years that followed both 
Remembrance Sunday and wearing the red poppy were exten-
ded to refer to the dead of all armed conflicts.  However in nati-
onal narratives if the Second World War is seen as a “good war”, 
a noble fight against fascism, the battles of the last seventy years 
are more controversial, often associated with imperialism. 
This was brought into sharp relief at the end of the 1960s when 
in response to civil unrest the British Army was deployed in Nort-
hern Ireland. Casualties ensued including the shooting of fourte-
en Catholic civilians by the army in Derry on 30th January 1972, 
known as Bloody Sunday.  As political tensions escalated the 
following year, the silence at the Cenotaph Remembrance on 
Sunday ceremony was interrupted by two women, who had lost 
their husbands in the conflict, shouting:  “What about the war 
widows?”  They were protesting against their poverty and qu-
estioning their exclusion from ideas of the nation embedded in 
remembrance. Allegedly, police scrambled through the crowds, 
put hands over the women’s mouths and led them away. 
In 1987 a bomb interrupted the Remembrance Sunday parade 
at Enniskillen in Northern Ireland, killing 11 people. The per-
petrators, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in targeting such an 
event critiqued both the actions of the armed forces and the 
fiction of national unity implicit in such events. Northern Ireland 
Catholic communities had by then totally rejected the wearing 
of red remembrance poppies, linking them to the Ulster Unio-
nists and army atrocities such as Bloody Sunday. More recently, 
Premiere League Footballer James McClean originally from Der-
ry, has repeatedly refused to wear a poppy on his shirt worn by 
many English footballers in November.  Subject to a barrage of 
criticism including death threats, he has defended his position, 
explaining:
If the poppy was simply about World War One and Two victims 
alone, I’d wear it without a problem….but… it stands for all the 
conflicts that Britain has been involved in. Because of the history 
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where I come from in Derry, I cannot wear something that repre-
sents that.
Maclean’s rejection of the red poppy is not alone; presenter, Jon 
Snow, described the pressure to wear one on television, prior 
to Armistice Day, as “poppy fascism”. Others have chosen to 
adopt the white poppy to articulate their opposition to war, the 
purple poppy, which remembers animal victims of war, or the 
black poppy, which acts as a symbol of Black soldiers’ contribu-
tion to Britain campaigns in World War One and Two. The black 
poppy can be seen both as an indicative of how contested re-
membrance remains and as a response to the rhetoric of the far-
right which peddles an inaccurate but pervasive version of the 
First and Second World Wars as part of a  “glorious pre-mass-im-
migration past”. The leader of the British National Party, Nick 
Griffin, wore a red poppy when election campaigning and bro-
adcasting in 2009, despite requests from TRBL not to do so. The 
red poppy’s association with Britishness, legitimated him within 
traditional ideas of the nation as did the image of Nigel Farage, 
when leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 
wiping tears from his eyes as he viewed the ceramic poppies at 
the Tower of London.  In the cultural politics which will provide a 
backdrop to Brexit negotiations in the next two years it is to be 
hoped that the associations of the red remembrance poppy are 
either wrestled back from the far right or lose their centrality to 
the country’s sense of itself. 
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According to Simon Heffer, those who aspired to lead the Labour party after its 2015 election defeat were “not even fighting the last election, but rather the one 
in 1945”. Heffer – possibly Britain’s most reactionary colum-
nist – cited the 1945 general election to establish Labour’s ir-
relevance. For, according to him, Labour’s victory occurred in 
what he regarded as a very different country, one that “still 
had a substantial working class [and] low living standards”. 
The Right has always had a very particular take on 1945: it’s when 
Britain took the wrong turn, a mistake only corrected in 1979. 
Even the Right would however concede that the general election 
of 1945 is one of the key turning points of modern British history. 
Labour after all won a Commons majority for the first time and 
used it to create the welfare state and National Health Service, na-
tionalise key industries and to actively pursue a policy of full em-
ployment, all while the country recovered from fighting the war. 
But how has Labour remembered the election? What has been 
the cultural memory of what was the party’s greatest triumph? 
History and cultural memory
According to Emily Robinson, so far as political parties are 
concerned the past serves a radically different function to the 
one it used to perform. For Labour as with the Conservatives 
the past now just affirms the present: it does not have an in-
dependent existence, so that it can no longer hold the present 
to account. The past remains important but in a very restricted 
way. It can for example be useful for politicians to claim a link 
with the past – to assert that they are part of some kind of tra-
dition - but this past, that tradition is merely the tool of tho-
se who call it into being.  For, citing the past does not imply 
the present has any responsibility to it, for history has become, 
as Robinson puts it, “a political prop, not a political force”. 
According to her, both parties now have the same relations-
hip to the past one defined by 
their adherence to “progress” and 
“modernity”. Robinson sees this 
transformation as part of a gene-
ral change in popular attitudes, 
which means that for most peo-
ple the past has become part of a 
“permanent present”. Historians 
have started to explore this pheno-
menon and in particular what they 
term “cultural memory”, that is a 
“memory” of events of which most 
have no personal experience, one 
that according to Geoff Eley, has 
been transmitted through “confu-
sions of mass-mediated meanings”. 
Labour and cultural memory
Political parties have played their 
part in shaping the nation’s cultu-
ral memory. Indeed, according to 
Henry Drucker, writing in 1979, La-
bour once had a ”strong sense of its 
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own past”, one that played a crucial role in reinforcing its sense 
of purpose. This consciousness of the past was certainly evident 
when Labour won office in July 1945. It is striking that when 
party figures made sense of their victory they looked to the past. 
To them, 1945 was the climax of Labour’s ineluctable rise, 
the end of the beginning of what Francis Williams called its 
”Magnificent Journey”. This was seen as an evolutionary 
process, with Labour conceived as part of developing national 
tradition that began with Magna Carta and the Peasant’s Revolt. 
Thanks to this way of thinking, it was believed 1945 was part of 
an irreversible process. So, even defeat in 1951 did not unduly 
dismay many party members: it merely showed that Labour ne-
eded to redouble its efforts and remain true to its beliefs and 
the tradition which had found its ultimate manifestation in 1945. 
Drucker claims Hugh Gaitskell and other revisionists challenged 
this perspective. For they asserted that the past was not a guide 
to the future, and that the party needed to rethink some of the key 
policies with which 1945 was associated – notably nationalization. 
According to them Labour had to become a “future-orientated or-
ganization”. After Gaitskell’s death, Harold Wilson stressed even 
more than did his predecessor Labour’s embrace of modernity. 
To make it relevant to the “New Britain”, Wilson famously tied 
the party’s fortunes to “the white heat of technological change”.
According to Drucker the denigration of the past was ill jud-
ged. Labour members needed a sense of history, one large-
ly comprised of folk memories of trade union struggle and 
workplace suffering, as these bound the party’s working-class 
supporters to the organization. Such socially rooted me-
mories, obligated those in the present to honour those figu-
res from the past who had sacrificed themselves to the future. 
But the party of which Drucker wrote in 1979 was in flux, its 
membership in decline and becoming 
more middle-class. Trade union influence 
would soon suffer a severe reverse: by the 
start of the 1990s the unions were a cowed 
and marginal force. By then Labour had 
responded to four successive electoral de-
feats with Neil Kinnock’s “modernization”, 
a process that ended with New Labour. 
And if Gaitskell had started the process of 
transforming Labour’s attitude to the past 
then as in so many other ways Tony Blair 
completed it. New Labour was – as the 
name implied –enthusiastically “modern”. 
“Old Labour” was the name New Labour 
gave the party’s past. So Blair’s interpreta-
tion of 1945 was an exercise in picking and 
choosing. For while he claimed to “honour 
the generation of 1945” Blair did not feel 
bound by them. He even criticized the li-
kes of Attlee for not resolving “fundamen-
tal issues of ideology and organization”, by 
which Blair meant leaving clause four in pla-
ce and not tackling the unions’ role in the 
7
The Cultural Memory of 1945
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Clement Attlee, Prime Minister from 1945 to 51 and mythic 
architect of the Labour Party’s key accomplishments of the 
post-war era.
 British Politics Review
party. Blair consequently only highlighted the “enduring values 
of 1945”, that is those that in his view remained relevant to New 
Labour’s position. This meant emphasising that in winning in 
1945 Labour’s agenda “cut decisively with not against the grain 
of political thinking” and embodied “national purpose and per-
sonal advancement”, “economic modernization” and individual 
“freedom”. Blair was also keen to stress that Attlee’s winning 
agenda owed much to ideas generated from outside the party, 
notably the “radical Liberal tradition”. In this way he argued New 
Labour was doing the work of the generation of 1945, by remai-
ning true to their “values” even as Blair disavowed the kind of 
state collectivism with which 1945 is conventionally associated. 
The Spirit of ‘45
Ken Loach’s 2013 documentary The Spirit of ’45 outlined a less 
nuanced perspective. This gathering of ‘memories and reflecti-
ons’ was a much-heralded attempt to convince those living in 
Austerity Britain that there was a viable alternative. According to 
the film this was manifested in those popular socialist sentiments 
revealed by the Second World War and which were responsi-
ble for Labour’s victory. As such, the film is probably the most 
overtly politicized example of the ‘cultural memory’ of 1945. 
According to Loach, Labour applied socialist collectivism through 
its nationalisation programme, welfare measures and creation of 
the NHS. Excerpts from Let Us Face the Future feature large, whi-
le a clip in which Attlee refers to Labour as a ”socialist” party is 
repeated so as to suggest that the people’s mood was matched 
by Labour’s own ambition. Collectivism having withered with 
Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979 Loach claimed: ”It’s time 
to put back on the agenda the importance of public ownership 
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and public good, the value of working together collaboratively, 
not in competition”. For, the film argues, as the people had once 
embraced socialism, they could do so again, signified visually at 
the end when hitherto black and white clips from the 1940s ap-
pear in colour, suggesting 1945 and 2013 were closer than some 
might imagine. According to one of Loach’s interviewees, soun-
ding very much like a Labour figure from the 1940s, 1945 was 
but one expression of the people’s ongoing desire to hold things 
in common, something first expressed in the Peasants Revolt. 
Loach’s political intentions in making the film became obvious in 
2014 when he helped form Left Unity, which stood candidates in 
the 2015 general election, against Labour. Left Unity’s programme 
followed the one outlined in his documentary: a complete rejecti-
on of the market. This was of course not the approach for which 
Labour stood in 2015 or 1945, but then Loach was no social de-
mocrat. Since then however Loach has thrown his support behind 
Jeremy Corbyn’s hard left leadership of the Labour Party, and has 
in turn been embraced by Corbyn’s support group Momentum.
Conclusion
As Emily Robinson might have predicted, 1945 has become 
the plaything of Labour’s present: a useful device to inspi-
re activists, and if articulated in the right way, ordinary voters. 
But if Labour is now afraid to say much beyond banaliti-
es about the election, 1945 hasn’t quite disappeared. Tho-
se to Labour’s left and its right still have an active cultural 
memory of the period. Ironically both see 1945 a socialist 
moment, the former to suggest the continued relevance 
of collectivism, the latter to make the very opposite point.
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Amritsar (1919). Kent State (1970).  Sharpeville (1960). So-weto (1976). Tiananmen Square (1989). The list of massa-cres of peaceful protesters by their own governing forces 
is lengthy and would obliterate the word limit of this issue if 
all could possibly be named. But when citizens are again kil-
led by authorities, Peterloo is often invoked and remembered. 
That massacre, in Manchester on 16 August 1819, saw fifteen 
people mortally wounded on the day and over 650 injured. What 
started out as a peaceful gathering with a carnival atmosphe-
re, ended up becoming, as Robert Poole states, ”the bloodiest 
political event of the nineteenth century on English soil.” 
Many more have been killed in other massacres, yet Peterloo 
remains significant in the public consciousness when others are 
forgotten. Approaching the bicen-
tenary of the event there will be 
papers, conferences and comme-
morations around the world. This 
article considers why this event, 
which is not taught regularly at 
schools or universities, and has 
no monument, has been remem-
bered, continuing to serve as a 
touchstone for subsequent killings 
of citizens who protest. 
The facts—the names and dates—
are generally agreed on. Unarmed 
people from the Lancashire re-
gion, consisting of men, women 
and children marched to St. Pe-
ter’s Field in Manchester carrying 
banners protesting that one of the 
biggest cities in Britain had no ele-
cted representative in Parliament. 
Among slogans on the banners 
were ”Annual Parliaments”, ”The 
Poor the Source of all Govern-
ment”, ”Labour is the Source of All 
Wealth” and ”No Taxation Without 
Equal Representation”. A number 
of women reformers dressed in white surrounded the hustings 
that were occupied by the organisers, headed by Henry ”Ora-
tor” Hunt, who was to address the crowd. Surrounding them 
were 1,500 troops, 1,000 of whom were regular soldiers.
The authorities, headed by clerical magistrates, the Reverend 
Charles Ethelston and the Reverend William Robert Hay, the 
self-termed ”Committee of Public Safety”, gathered at a Mr. Bux-
ton’s house, which overlooked St Peter’s Field.  They then waited 
until 1.35 pm. when the crowd had grown to around 60-80,000 
before Ethelston reputedly read the Riot Act from a window, lea-
ning out so far that Hay allegedly held his coat. Many said that it 
was never read. The Manchester and Salford Yeomanry, which con-
sisted of well-off young men who had bought their own uniforms, 
then attempted to get to the hustings to arrest the organisers, 
but soon got into trouble as they tried to hack their way through 
the compacting crowd. The real soldiers, the 15th Hussars, some 
of whom were wearing their Waterloo medals, then followed. 
Only twenty-five minutes after the Riot Act was reported to have 
been read, the field had been cleared, except for the casualti-
es. In the surrounding streets those escaping were pursued and 
attacked in the hours that followed. The Prince Regent, later Ge-
orge IV, congratulated the yeomanry on their actions that day, 
and the poet laureate Robert Southey’s first response was to or-
ganise a petition supporting those he believed had put down 
a ‘rascally rabble’.  The name ‘Peter-loo’ was coined, firstly in 
The Manchester Observer, apparently because the Hussars were 
wearing their Waterloo medals. Another explanation is that a 
special constable entered the house of an Ann Jones, who was 
helping the wounded, and shouted ”This is Waterloo for you – 
this is Waterloo!”
The backdrop of this bloody event 
included economic decline and politi-
cal repression. The period from 1815 
to 1821, saw reformers and radicals 
fighting through strikes and protests to 
gain access to representation in unre-
formed Britain, where under 5% of the 
male population had the right to vote. 
After the battle of Waterloo, a post-war 
slump set in that was worsened with 
poor harvests—the explosion of Mo-
unt Tambora in Indonesia caused the 
famous ”year without a summer”. With 
around 200 000 combatants returning 
from the war to unemployment, Bri-
tain was in the depths of a depression. 
The period from 1819 to 1820 marks 
the high point of repression in Britain 
during the nineteenth century. In the 
months after Peterloo, ”Six Acts” were 
passed that affected freedoms and tre-
bled the price of newspapers. ”Rebel-
lions” followed, at least one of which 
was fomented by a government spy 
system that aimed to draw out radical 
reformers. These apparent risings, in-
volving a very small number of people, 
led to eight men being publically hanged and beheaded for 
High Treason in front of crowds of up to 100 000 people at Glas-
gow, London and Stirling, between May and September 1820. 
It was another ninety-six years, until the Easter Rising in 1916, 
before anyone was executed for High Treason again.
In the immediate aftermath of Peterloo there was a battle to 
control and set the narrative of the event in the minds of the 
public. All events are ephemeral and different versions of 
how they should be remembered battle for domination in the 
public sphere. Narratives of Peterloo took many forms including: 
a public trial of the organisers, an inquest into a death, newspa-
per articles, published accounts and, perhaps most powerfully, 
poetry and illustrations that could transmit messages to even 
the illiterate. At the time of writing there have been found, in 
various archives, over three hundred eye-witness accounts by 
266 people who witnessed the march to St. Peter’s Field and 
the massacre. The London Times had a reporter, John Tyas, on 
9
Remembering Peterloo
by  John Gardner
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the platform with the organisers, and his accounts sided with 
the people who were massacred. Probably the most widely read 
version of events is Samuel Bamford’s Passages in the Life of a 
Radical (1838).  Bamford had been on the hustings with Hunt 
and has been hugely influential in shaping perceptions of the 
massacre: 
The cavalry were in confusion: they evidently could not, with all 
the weight of man and horse, penetrate that compact mass of 
human beings; and their sabres were plied to hew a way through 
naked held-up hands, and defenceless heads; and then chop-
ped limbs, and wound-gaping skulls were seen, and groans and 
cries were mingled with the din of that horrid confusion.  ”Ah! 
Ah!” ”for shame! for shame!” was shouted.
The trial of the organisers led to Bamford, Hunt and three others 
being imprisoned. An inquest for John Lees, a Waterloo veteran 
who had been stabbed and suffered a lingering death, exposed 
some of the barbarity of the massacre. Lees is reported as saying 
that ”at Waterloo there was man to man, but there it was down-
right murder”. 
Many accounts in prose and poetry, such as Percy Shelley’s 
”Mask of Anarchy”, depict women being murdered at Peterloo. 
Sherwin’s Weekly Register asserted: ”Women appear to have 
been the particular objects of the fury of the Cavalry Assassins. 
One woman […] was sabred over the head [...] some were sa-
bred in the breast; so inhuman, indiscriminate, and fiend-like, 
was the conduct of the Manchester Yeomanry Cavalry.” Figures 
compiled by M. L. Bush in The Casualties of Peterloo seem to 
bear this out. A two-year-old child there with his mother was the 
first victim on the day. Although comprising only an eighth of the 
number at Peterloo, more than a quarter of all casualties were 
women. Four of the fifteen killed on the day were women and 
indeed illustrations, poems and articles all emphasise women 
being particularly targeted. Most accounts by sympathisers of 
the protesters seem to exonerate the regular soldiers and damn 
the yeomanry.
The established church is also remembered badly by this event. 
The clerical magistrates Hay and Ethelstone became the subje-
ct of articles, squibs, poetry and devastating cartoons such as 
George Cruikshank’s ”The Clerical Magistrate”. This illustration 
from The Political House that Jack Built shows the incompatible 
position of churchmen acting as judges. On the left Ethelston 
holds a cross and preaches above the Christogram ”IHS”. Facing 
the right he holds a gibbet, shackles and a flail as he ”Commits 
starving vagrants” above a crown with the initials GPR--George 
Prince Regent.
The continued remembrance of Peterloo, without a monument, 
an educational curriculum, or living memory, serves as a warning 
that, even in periods of the severest repression, state-sanctioned 
violence is not forgotten. Peterloo is a Mancunian wound that, 
through multi-media exposure, became visible all over the wor-
ld, as the art it inspired found new audiences. The people and 
institutions responsible for the massacre are remembered with 
ignominy. Out of all of the memorials though I think that the 
poetry and cartoons have survived best. The compression of an-
ger in Shelley’s poem ”England in 1819” where he sides with a 
”people starved and stabbed on the untilled field” has survived. 
George Cruikshank’s still rousing illustrations of Peterloo such as 
”Manchester Heroes”, ”Peterloo Memorial” and ”Steel Lozen-
ges”, devastatingly mock and mangle the guilty with a sardonic, 
lacerating humour that can produce a laugh and sickness at the 
same time.  Writing in Past and Present Thomas Carlyle stated 
that Peterloo had left a ”treasury of rage” behind ”ever sin-
ce”. The historian G. M. Trevelyan’s last words were reportedly, 
”Peterloo 1819”. 
George Cruikshank. ‘Steel Lozenges’. The Man in the Moon. London: 
William Hone, 1819.
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Gathering thoughts on the day the May-inspired General Election is called, there seems little room for ”heritage” in any tangible form, although the cheap hucksterism 
of ”Brexit Means Brexit” relies on a broad presumed concern for 
national identity and its icons. Heritage may well form the reas-
suring backdrop to debates as to the rights (and costs) of ”our” 
welfare structures, and indeed the endowed British qualities of 
contesting leaders. 
In 1985 Patrick Wright published On Living in an Old Country, 
and two years later Robert Hewison authored The Heritage In-
dustry: Britain in a Climate of Decline. Both made swinging cri-
ticism of the impression that, for middle-class Britain, at least, 
”the past was a better place”, a view that excluded concern 
for contemporary issues and especially cultural creativity. Earli-
er, in 1981, architectural critic, Stephen Games had concluded 
that ”as the belief in heritage grips us more and more firmly … 
we consign ourselves to a great cultural holding operation … 
a necropolis for tourists and romantic 
poets”.
Over thirty years, a generation, how 
has Britain responded? There is cer-
tainly more designated ”heritage”, 
more collections and events drawing 
crowds, more collecting of past arte-
facts, more museums and experiences, 
more re-creative events, more plaqu-
es on buildings, more debates over 
demolition, more rock group revivals, 
and more fashion re-cycling. With this 
development came a proliferation of 
popular terminology – vintage, vete-
ran, classic, antique, collectors, retro 
etc. All share the implication of saving 
from the past, sharing and/or reusing 
in the present with the expectation that 
future generations will learn and enjoy.
Is this not just an element in the 
future-directed design cycle? Trouble is that the earlier critics 
did not see ”heritage” as an important element in design and 
innovation evolution. The current London Science Museum dis-
play on robots is not an aspic covered glass box exhibit, but an 
orchestrated consolidation of past ideas available to the many 
viewers to consider and dream on. Bowie’s costumes at the V & 
A performed a similar function. If the visitor builds on the past 
for their future it is worthwhile. 
The understanding of British ”heritage” has moved mightily in 
the past century. When I tagged on in the early 1950s, it was 
largely the unattractive opportunity to visit, with suitable reve-
rence, cathedrals, and Ministry of Works sites that the state had 
decided might encourage belief that shattered stonework would 
stimulate a concern for Royal history.
The 1951 Festival of Britain blew that apart by suggesting that 
traditional craft and industry could sit alongside post-war inn-
ovation – modern art references to English traditions with late 
Industrial machines and structures. At that time the little used 
concept of ”heritage” largely applied to stately homes, religio-
us buildings and civic structures intended to impress - access 
controlled and relatively uninformed. A major exception were 
the country houses and landscapes managed by the National 
Trust (founded 1895, statutory power 1907) whose oak leaf sym-
bol marked many coastal, heath and moorland sites, and whose 
blue-rinsed lay volunteers guarded the dowdy interiors of man-
sions that original owners had foresworn.
Today the National Trust remains a 
major charitable player, maintaining 
conservation aims but broadening 
attitude and policy to encourage 
active family use of grounds, events 
and commercial activity (”Disneyficati-
on” as some critics would have it). Not 
all heritage-related organisations have 
fared so well. The Civic Trust, founded 
in 1959 as a force for urban design qu-
ality and town heritage had a trusted 
seat at policy tables with award sche-
mes and Heritage Open Days, but by 
2009 was would up. It’s major product 
– town centre quality – not sufficiently 
high on the agenda of car-borne shop-
pers or government.
Changes in heritage identification, 
conservation, management and access 
have always been tied to the need for 
funding to save and conserve elements 
that appeal – through professional judgement, or more personal 
choice – to individuals or enthusiasts.
A substantial change in the way in which stately homes, and 
their occupants, were viewed by a broader public came about 
when the Marques of Bath opened his home at Longleat on a 
commercial basis in 1949 and a Safari Park in 1966, similarly the 
Duke of Bedford at Woburn Abbey in 1970. It was all very well 
for flamboyant owners to go public, but shared heritage, part 
of a nationalised industry, was something different. In 1961, the 
demolition of the 1837 Doric Arch in front of Euston Station in 
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by Abram Games, from the cover of the South Bank Exhibition 
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London was, perhaps, the single event that most clearly alerted 
a comfortable, informed elite, that change meant change. The 
arch, a substantial part of which has latterly been fished out of a 
London waterway, may well be reconstructed to herald the arri-
val of the HS2 high-speed London to Birmingham rail link, which 
will itself destroy substantial natural, landscape, and archaeolo-
gical heritage in its passage.
A passing generation still sees Euston as the ”Waterloo” of he-
ritage battles in Britain, though the subject (and indeed its pro-
grammed reconstruction) seem of little public interest. At the 
time it did extend the heritage debate with provocative headli-
nes – ”Monumental Folly” (Peter Hall) and ”The Rape of Britain” 
(Amery & Cruickshank). A broader public interest was strongly 
encouraged by the Council of Europe’s Architectural Heritage 
Year (EAHY) in 1975, not the only European event to benefit 
Britain’s heritage! EAHY encouraged interpretation (demystifica-
tion from fine art language), education and access to built herita-
ge. In the same year SAVE, an effective pressure group for thre-
atened buildings was established. EAHY substantially reshaped 
British heritage alerting local communities to their place-making 
assets.
By 1983 English Heritage was established to manage the public 
stock of historic buildings, latterly developing their income po-
tential, and also to offer conservation advice and judgement on 
building change. After 2015 the title was retained by the «indus-
trial» arm, developing the commercial potential of monuments, 
whilst Historic England focused on designation and protection. 
Like the National Trust, these are the heritage industry giants. 
Even more influential in both the scope and support for heritage 
has been the Heritage Lottery Fund, established as a distribu-
tor of national lottery investment in 1993. This has really been 
the major driving force of heritage policy since its establishment 
with increasingly focused funding of museums, parks, town cen-
tres and many other initiatives. Increasingly the HLF has deman-
ded evidence that heritage projects are grounded in community 
interests and long term support before financial help is offered.
When the York Archaeological Trust took advantage of recent 
developer excavations to design the Yorvik Viking Centre in 
1984 they were estimating that a novel, ride-based, undergro-
und experience would draw successfully from a York tourist mar-
ket. They were right, and were the first to offer heritage as an 
«experience» based on an established market and indigenous 
heritage. 
By 2000 the British heritage industry had lost its way.  «In-
terpretation» and ”experiences” had glossed over authenticity. 
Prime Minister Blair re-christened the ”Department of National 
Heritage” as ”The Department of Culture, Media and Sport” 
and embarked on a series of concepts without substance. The 
Millennium Experience in the Dome – now the O2 Arena – 
was the clearest example of this; a structure with loss-making, 
unappealing, sponsored content. 
Heritage, in its broadest sense, was saved and nourished by te-
levision, and latterly by personal electronic media highlighting 
what is to see, enjoy and where. The industry has benefitted 
from, but will seldom acknowledge, carefully crafted series that 
link the viewer with a personal past, be it objects, relatives or 
local history. This is where heritage hits home.
The ”Antiques Roadshow” begun in 1979, a discussion of prized 
personal objects offering expert analysis and value estimates. 
”Bargain Hunt”, a game show of find and sell started in 2000. 
Each series encourages looking, finding, evaluating and under-
standing a personal heritage. Add to this ”Time Team” a weekly 
short-term archaeological dig that suggested that everywhere 
there might be a worthwhile past underground. It ran from 1994 
to 2014 but convinced a generation that archaeology was wort-
hwhile, that sites needed excavation, that the distant past was 
interesting. Finally add ”Who Do You Think You Are?”, 2004 and 
ongoing, an hour-long genealogical study of a ”celebrity” where 
tears mesh with connections low and high, and encourage use 
of the web sites that now uncover for all so many previously 
obscure documents.
British heritage may well still be located ”out there” but is less 
likely to be unapproachable, more likely to be available at the 
weekend, with events, with hands on, with minor TV stars, with 
a chance for you and yours to grab a bit for your own past and 
future. The semi-sacred, professionally designated heritage re-
mains, and is essential for conservation, authenticity, ICOMOS 
determinations and the rest, but there is also now the personal 
link that is so essential in funding the future of heritage.
Britain’s heritage is, indeed, an industry and one which can bring 
substantial returns, but how far will market forces steer conser-
vation judgements in the future? Will the decaying skills of aged 
volunteers be replaced by apprentice training, will «experien-
ces» rule over displays based on authenticity, and who will de-
cide which personal or community heritage deserves raising to 
regional or national status?  Motorbikes, rock star costumes, mi-
nor post-War vehicles, Bakelite, football grounds, early mobile 
phones and retro shop fronts all vie for attention. How far will we 
permit the market to be the measure of survival?
Preferences and policies for discarding or conserving the past 
say much for our individual and shared vision of the future. 
Watch carefully if, and when, Britain moves beyond the Brexit 
tautology.
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There has always been an ambivalence about the Bri-tish memory of the Second World War.  “Carrying on”, “muddling through”, “the Dunkirk/Blitz spirit”, have 
become national cultural shorthand for the British experience 
of “the People’s War”, embodying social unity, a can-do spirit, 
and a moment of national togetherness unsurpassed before or 
since.  This vision of Britain has been sufficiently versatile to be 
embraced by both the political left (who saw the 1945 general 
election as the climax of socialist aspiration) and the right (who 
cast Britain as leading the rest of the world to victory through 
strong leadership and national resolve). 
There has likewise been an ambivalence about British cultural re-
presentations of the Second World War. The films made during 
the war are popularly dismissed as crude patriotic propaganda, 
so by definition unworthy of close attention, though the best 
of them are in fact tightly crafted, grounded in real experience, 
and suffused with authentic loss.  Subsequent screen renditions, 
whether for film or television, have had to tread a careful path: 
too dour an approach offends the patriotic, too glamorised a 
depiction prompts accusations of disrespect.  
The most celebrated wartime films were of course both socially 
inclusive and implicitly progressive in tone, a “soft” politicisation 
of the “People’s war” that had clear propaganda value as well 
as appealing directly to the lives and concerns of contemporary 
audiences. However, the growing mythology of a victorious “Pe-
ople’s War” saw the war itself recede into a collection of comfor-
ting stereotypes that arguably sustained a nation in imperial 
decline.  By the late 1980s, with Margaret Thatcher riding high 
on the “Falklands Factor” and invoking Britain’s wartime defian-
ce in her arguments against the EU, it appeared to many that 
while the progressive left had initially thought they had “won” 
the war, the nationalistic right had snatched it from them.  It 
was in this context that in 1991 historian Angus Calder caused 
consternation among right-wing commentators by arguing that 
what he provocatively termed the “myth of the Blitz” was deri-
ved less from the historical reality of home front life than from 
the propaganda efforts aimed at home and overseas audiences 
(specifically the USA) during the war.  His plea for a more realistic 
and politically aware understanding of the war and what it meant 
to the British people then and since seemed vindicated when in 
1994 John Major’s Conservative government astonishingly an-
nounced that the official 50th anniversary commemorations of 
D-Day would centre around street parties, Glenn Miller concerts 
and “spam fritter competitions” in Hyde Park - plans then hastily 
revised to focus on veterans’ groups and the landings instead. 
It is noteworthy, then, how popular cultural treatments of the 
Second World War have sought more thoughtful engagements 
with both the history and the popular memory of the war. In 
fact – if one sets aside the enduringly popular Dad’s Army (BBC, 
1968-77) – which effectively now is the British popular memory 
of the Home Guard – screen engagements with the war have 
become typically more critical and complex over time. As early 
as 1970 ITV’s A Family At War (1970-72) was portraying the ten-
sions and burdens of everyday wartime life. During the 1970s 
and 1980s a sequence of BBC Plays for Today interrogated 
anti-Semitism, patriotism, class and gender (The Evacuees; 
Licking Hitler; The Imitation Game; Rainy Day Women), while 
ITV series Danger – UXB (ITV, 1979), We’ll Meet Again (ITV, 1982) 
and Piece of Cake (ITV 1986) placed a variety of personal and 
emotional dramas within specific wartime settings (respectively 
a London bomb disposal unit, a rural village “invaded” by GIs 
and an RAF base). 
The 1990s and 2000s saw some notably downbeat film depicti-
ons of wartime in The End of the Affair (1999), Enigma (2001) 
and Atonement (2007), while on television Housewife, 49 (ITV, 
2006) dramatised raw familial tensions. However, it was the 
phenomenally successful detective series Foyle’s War (ITV, 2002-
2015) that perhaps offered the most surprising critical take on 
the wartime home front, exposing xenophobia, collaboration, 
institutional prejudice, official incompetence, petty corruption 
and sexual violence among other wartime failings, while presen-
ting the war itself as often simply the context rather than the 
focus of the plot. Yet, expertly packaged as “heritage” drama, 
it attracted a large and loyal mainstream audience, and glowing 
accolades from newspapers which might have been expected to 
take exception to its distinctly revisionist stance, even in its final 
two series, set during the early years of post-war austerity, which 
suggest a nation struggling to put into practice the promises of 
the war against establishment resistance.
The two most recent (at the time of writing) examples of British 
popular culture engaging with the Second World War offer their 
own – and in their separate ways, also telling – takes on the 
wartime home front experience.  First, The Halcyon (ITV, Jan-
Feb 2017): a drama series set in a Mayfair hotel between May 
and December 1940. The setting would appear ideal for inter-
rogating a range of elements of wartime life; however, the nar-
rative appears unsure of its purpose. Plot-driven improbabilities 
abound: a hotel manager with a secret past and an enviable list 
of influential contacts; his barely adult daughter promoted from 
receptionist to assistant manager with unlikely ease; the resident 
American radio journalist styled as a cross between Edward R. 
Murrow and Rick Blaine from Casablanca; the sudden revelation 
that a leading character is in fact an enemy spy, and his equally 
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sudden - and drastic - demise). There are also some implausibly 
modern takes on class, race and sexuality (not to mention 1940s 
jazz culture). Underneath it all, the “myth” of 1940 does pre-
vail: the Blitz is realistically frightening, but everyone does “carry 
on”, and tragedy when it strikes (albeit heavily flagged) provides 
a genuinely moving moment. But it is a curiously depoliticised 
narrative: the only upstairs-downstairs tension is personality-dri-
ven; the hotel attracts none of the opprobrium that its London 
counterparts were receiving at just this time for enabling their 
clienteles to dine and dance in full pre-war style during air raids 
in their suitably reinforced private basement shelters; nor inde-
ed does it suffer, as famously did the Savoy Hotel during the 
air raids of 15 September 1940, an “invasion” of angry working 
class Londoners demanding shelter also.  
Second, Their Finest, released in British cinemas in April 2017 
and based on Lissa Evans’ 2010 novel, Their Finest Hour and a 
Half, set among a wartime film production team. On one level 
it offers another broadly conventional portrayal of wartime Lon-
doners “taking it”. However, it is considerably more invested in 
historical plausibility than The Halcyon – notably an unflinching 
presentation of male attitudes to women’s employment roles 
during the war - and is also quietly sensitive to class, showing 
plausible groupings of people drawn together by the war, their 
different class backgrounds obvious and visible but presented as 
an accepted part of a mixed social environment; yet with hints 
that historical layers of deference are being gradually peeled 
away. Intriguingly, the film demonstrates a keen understanding 
not just of wartime life but of the wartime propaganda films that 
ostensibly drive the plot, both in its depiction of one such film’s 
creation, and in its own self-conscious following of these films’ 
typical narrative trajectory: new experiences and freedoms, pe-
ril from enemy attack, sudden and unexpected tragedy, wren-
ching internalised grief, and, finally, renewed resolve, all under-
pinned by a soft political engagement with issues of privilege, 
opportunity and sacrifice. It also respects the wartime cinema 
audience it portrays as having a healthy scepticism of clumsy 
film propaganda (in the film’s opening scene) and a sincere but 
self-aware emotional engagement in the final film (during its clo-
sing sequence).
What of the future?  Certainly, an increasing interest in personal, 
local and sectional experiences has expanded public memory of 
the conflict: witness, for instance, the BBC”s highly successful 
People’s War website, launched in 2003; the unveiling of an of-
ficial memorial to “The Women of World War II” at Whitehall in 
2005; or the crowdfunded project to mark the 70th anniversary 
of the Bethnal Green tube disaster in 1943.  The ways in which 
the war features in popular culture also appears increasingly 
diverse in approach and purpose.  The BBC has, for instance, 
made a recent (and not altogether successful) foray into alt-his-
tory, with its dramatisation of Len Deighton’s 1978 novel SS-GB 
criticised for its dour and oddly flat representation of London 
under Nazi rule - though it perhaps suffered from comparisons 
with Amazon Prime’s high-concept American-set variant, The 
Man in the High Castle. And at the time of writing, two new 
films are due for imminent cinema release. Dunkirk promises an 
immersive experience of the evacuations from the perspectives 
of land, sea and (unusually) the air, deploying IMAX technology, 
with minimal backstories, pared-down dialogue, and featuring 
mostly relative unknowns as the soldiers. Churchill aims to chal-
lenge precedent by portraying the wartime leader not as a ci-
gar-chomping bulldog figure but as a depressed and exhausted 
old man whose obsession with the past (specifically, his fear of 
presiding over another Gallipoli) threatens to jeopardise the 
D-Day landings, but who must ultimately cede to his American 
and European allies.  The war – and its political meanings - con-
tinues to be recast.
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Foyle’s War: “the phenomenally successful detective series that perhaps offered 
the most surprising critical take on the wartime home front […] while presenting the 
war itself as often simply the context rather than the focus of the plot.
Siân Nicholas is a Reader in Modern 
British History at Aberystwyth Univer-
sity in Wales. She has taught at Abe-
rystwyth since 1992, where she spe-
cialises in modern British history (in 
particular the British home front in the 
First and Second World Wars) and the 
history of the mass media, especially 
the press and broadcasting.
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Forthcoming edition of  British Politics Review
One year ago, the Brexit referendum pitted young against old, city against 
countryside, cosmopolitan elites against the white working-class. On 8 
June, the general election will testify to the deep-seated geographical and 
social tension within England. The North, once the workshop of the Indus-
trial Revolution, is a key battleground as to what country England – and 
the wider British union – should be. The next issue of British Politics Review 
is devoted to the North, its political and cultural expressions, internal 
contradictions and outlook in the post-Brexit quest for a new narrative 
about England.
The summer edition of British Politics Review is due to arrive in August 
2017.
Membership 2017
Membership in BPS is open to individuals and institutions. As a member, 
you recieve subscription to four editions of British Politics review, invitation 
to all events organised by the society and the right to vote at out annual 
general meeting.
Our membership comes into force as soon as the membership fee, 200 
NOK for 2017, has been registred at our account 6094 05 67788 
If you have any questions about membership, please to not hesitate to 
contact us by e-mail at
mail@britishpoliticssociety.no
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